Volume 21
Issue 3 Summer 1991
Summer 1991

Administrative Law
Brendan Mahoney
Steven E. Sessions
Kathryn Hoh

Recommended Citation
Brendan Mahoney, Steven E. Sessions & Kathryn Hoh, Administrative Law, 21 N.M. L. Rev. 481 (1991).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol21/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This survey article focuses on the exercise of governmental functions
by state agencies. The discussion is divided into three parts, following
the pattern established in the past six surveys of administrative law,' and
examines significant appellate decisions during the period from February
1, 1988 to July 31, 1989 that address the authority of state agencies to
act, their exercise of that authority, and judicial review of their decisions.
This survey period has seen a significant legislative development in the
area of administrative law. In March of 1989, the New Mexico Legislature
amended the Public Rules Act to institute an official registry for state
agency rules and decisions. 2 The registry, published twice a month, should
help to extend notice of proposed rulemakings and ease the process of
locating agency rules. Part II of this article discusses the importance of
the registry in the development of state administrative law. 3
Appellate cases decided during the survey period provide a fruitful
source for analysis of developments in New Mexico's administrative law.
Part I of this article, addressing the authority of agencies to act, examines
a group of cases in which the courts upheld agencies' delegated authority
to make and apply administrative law. 4 In particular, Part I discusses
the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Local 2238 of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Stratton,5 in
which the court recognized implicit legislative approval for the state's
public employees to engage in collective bargaining, allowing the State
Personnel Board to promulgate and apply rules for labor-management
the absence of an express delegation of authority from
relations even in
6
legislature.
the
Part II focuses on the application of a whole record review to an
agency rulemaking action, a less deferential form of judicial review
generally reserved for agency adjudicatory actions. 7 The increasing use
of whole record review demands that agencies pay closer attention to
building a complete record of their administrative proceedings. Other
cases discussed in this section focus on recent developments in specific
procedural issues in agency ratemakings and adjudications, including the
continuing confusion about when an agency must act in order to retain
jurisdiction over a case.'

1. See Kelly & Gilmore, Administrative Law, 19 N.M.L. REV. 575 (1989); Browde & Schultz,
Administrative Law, 15 N.M.L. REv. 119 (1985): Kelly & O'Leary, Administrative Law, 14 N.M.L.
REv. 1 (1984); Shapiro & Jacobvitz, Administrative Law, 13 N.M.L. REV. 235 (1983); Browde,
Administrative Law, 12 N.M.L. REV. 1 (1982); Browde, Administrative Law, 11 N.M.L. REV. 1
(1980-81).
2. 1989 N.M. Laws 241-42 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-7.1 (Supp. 1989)).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 122-33.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 11-82.
5. 108 N.M. 163, 769 P.2d 76 (1989).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 36-51.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 83-133.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 134-244.
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Part III of this article takes a close look at the increasing use of whole
record judicial review, particularly the progeny of Duke City Lumber
Co. v. Environmental Improvement Board.9 In Duke City, the supreme
court first applied the whole record standard of review to an agency
rulemaking, but it did not articulate how that standard should be applied
in subsequent cases.' 0
I.

AUTHORITY OF AGENCY TO ACT

State agencies are unique governmental actors in that they can play
different types of governmental roles at the same time. State agencies
can have the authority both to make new rules and regulations and to
render decisions in specific cases." In other words, they can perform
legislative as well as judicial functions, and they do so as members of
the executive branch of our state government.' 2 This flexibility allows
state agencies to perform complex governmental tasks such as licensing
health care providers, administering welfare programs, enforcing environmental standards, and collecting taxes.
The overlap of legislative and judicial power in agencies of the executive
branch might threaten the principle of separation of powers embedded
in our state constitution 3 were it not for two fundamental limitations
on the power of state agencies. First, agencies may exercise only the
power that is delegated to them by the legislature or the constitution. 14
Second, the judiciary retains the power to review and overrule agency
decisions in the courts. 5
Because limitations on agency power are mandated by the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers, a large body of administrative law tests
whether an agency has acted ultra vires, that is, beyond the scope of
its authority. 6 An agency action may be beyond its authority in two
ways. It may be performing activities that could not have been delegated
to it under the constitutional separation of powers. Or, if the delegation
was acceptable, the agency may be acting beyond the scope of the powers
delegated.

9. 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984); see infra text accompanying notes 245-301.
10. Duke City, 101 N.M. at 294-95, 681 P.2d at 720-21. For further discussion of this case,
see Browde, Substantial Evidence Reconsidered: The Post-Duke City Difficulties and Some Suggestions
for Their Resolution, 18 N.M.L. REV. 525 (1988).
11. See Kelly & Gilmore, supra note 1, at 576.
12. Id.
13. See N.M. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. That section of the New Mexico Constitution states:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,
the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
Id.
14. For a discussion of the non-delegation doctrine in New Mexico, see infra text accompanying
notes 19-52.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 52-82 for analysis of judicial review of agency decisions.
16. See Kelly & Gilmore, supra note 1, at 583.
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To test whether an agency has acted ultra vires, the courts look to
the statutes or constitutional provisions giving the agency power.17 Express
statutory circumscriptions of an agency's authority serve both to limit
the agency's power and to give the courts clear guidelines by which to
measure an agency's actions. Where the boundaries of an agency's power
are not so clear, construing the statute can be tantamount to defining
the scope of an agency's authority. 8
During this survey period, the supreme court reviewed the statutory
and constitutional bases for several agency rulemakings and adjudications
and found ample authority for the agencies' actions. In most of these
cases, the courts found the delegations of power to be clear and unambiguous and upheld the agencies' decisions as clearly within the scope
of their authority.
In other examples discussed in this article, the courts examined agency
actions that were not explicitly addressed in the statutes. In these instances,
the courts explored the intent of the legislature in making the delegations
and concluded that the agencies had acted within the scope of delegated
discretionary authority.
Regulatory Authority
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State Corporation
Commission19 presents a classic example of judicial analysis in an ultra
vires challenge to agency authority. This suit was brought by the telephone
company after a decision by the State Corporation Commission ("SCC")
to begin regulating the company's third-party billing and collection services. 20 The telephone company questioned whether the SCC had jurisA.

17. The construction of statutes is clearly the job of the courts. Madrid v. University of Cal.,
105 N.M. 715, 718, 737 P.2d 74, 77 (1987).
18. For a discussion of the methods of statutory construction, see Kelly & Gilmore, supra note
1, at 583-93. New Mexico courts will not necessarily defer to an agency interpretation when a
statute is unclear, but will seek to bring into effect the intent of the legislative body. An agency's
interpretation may be treated as persuasive, but not binding, evidence of the legislature's intent.
Molycorp, Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 95 N.M. 613, 624 P.2d 1010 (1981); New Mexico Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. State, 106 N.M. 73, 738 P.2d 1318 (1987). An agency's interpretation may be
accepted when the legislature clearly sought to delegate such policymaking authority to the agency.
Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 106 N.M. 622, 747 P.2d 917 (1987).
The federal rule is more explicit. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established that, where the law is
unclear, the court is to seek the intent of Congress and must defer to the agency's interpretation
of the law if it reasonably fulfills that intent.
19. 107 N.M. 745, 764 P.2d 876 (1988).
20. Id. at 746, 764 P.2d at 877. The SCC had conducted hearings to explore whether it had
jurisdiction to regulate in this area. Id. The agency made several findings in support of jurisdiction;
specifically, the agency found that the telephone company's billing service was an integral component
of telecommunications service as a whole, that Mountain Bell had a monopoly over billing, and
that the third-party service included recording the transmission of telephone signals and transmitting
data. Id. The SCC had previously regulated one aspect of the telephone company's collection services.
Id. Third-party service involves recording and billing customers for their use of long-distance lines
belonging to other phone companies. Id.
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diction to regulate2 services provided by the telephone company on behalf
of other carriers. '
The supreme court examined the delegations of authority granted to
the SCC by both the New Mexico Constitution and the New Mexico
Telecommunications Act. 22 In a brief analysis, the court found that the
SCC had "broad, plenary authority ' 23 to regulate New Mexico's transportation and transmission industries and common carriers under article
XI, section 7, of the state constitution.2 4 In fact, the court quoted from
prior litigation between the parties that it was "difficult to conceive of
a more clear and all-inclusive grant of power for a governmental agency. '25
The court also found statutory authority within the New Mexico Telecommunications Act for the SCC to certify public telecommunications
providers and regulate rates for the transmission of interstate signals. 26
Finding ample constitutional and statutory grounds for the SCC to regulate, the court upheld the agency's decision to extend its activities into
27
this arena.

In National Council on Compensation Insurance v. State Corporation
Commission,2 the supreme court construed the New Mexico Insurance
Rate Regulation Law 29 to decide who has authority to review and reject
insurance rate increases. 0 Here, the National Council on Compensation
Insurance ("NCCI") appealed a decision of the state Insurance Board 3'
to disapprove a workers' compensation insurance premium increase.3 2
NCCI argued that section 59A-17-14(B) of the state law conferred authority to disapprove a rate filing only upon the Superintendent of

21. Seeking reversal of the agency decision on both statutory and constitutional grounds, the
telephone company sought to remove the case directly to the supreme court. The court undertook
the review in accordance with the removal procedure, finding the constitutional question to be "the
sole issue for consideration." Id.
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 63-9A-1 to -20 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
23. Mountain States, 107 N.M. at 747, 764 P.2d at 878.
24. The section begins:
The commission shall have power and be charged with the duty of fixing, determining,
supervising, regulating and controlling all charges and rates of railway, express,
telegraph, telephone, sleeping-car and other transportation and transmission companies and common carriers within the state and of determining any matters of
public convenience and necessity relating to such facilities as expressed herein in
the manner which has been or shall be provided by law.
N.M. CoNST. art. XI, § 7.
25. Mountain States, 107 N.M. at 747, 764 P.2d at 878 (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 90 N.M. 325, 331, 563 P.2d 588, 594 (1977)).
26. Id.; see New Mexico Telecommunications Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 63-9A-1 to -20 (Repl.
Pamp. 1989). The court added a third element to its opinion. Noting that customer billings can
lead to the denial of telecommunications services for non-payment, the court found a distinct public
policy interest in SCC regulation of actions involving delinquent accounts. Mountain States, 107
N.M. at 747, 764 P.2d at 878.
27. Mountain States, 107 N.M. at 747, 764 P.2d at 878.
28. 107 N.M. 278, 756 P.2d 558 (1988).
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-17-1 to -35 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
30. 107 N.M. at 283, 756 P.2d at 563 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-17-14(B) (Repl. Pamp.
1988)).
31. Id. at 280, 756 P.2d at 560. The Corporation Commission was purportedly acting as the
Insurance Board and was named as a co-defendant in this suit. Id.
32. Id.
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Insurance and not upon the board as a body.3 3 This provision provides
that "[i]f . . . the superintendent finds that a filing does not meet the
applicable requirements ...he shall, after a hearing upon written notice
... issue an order . . . .,, The court, however, looked to the code as
a whole. The court reasoned that because the statutes conferred exclusive
jurisdiction over rate regulation law onto the board, the provision in
question had to be construed to give authority over rate filings to the
board as well as the superintendent.35
In Local 2238 of the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees v. Stratton,36 the supreme court construed a state
statute to find implied legislative authority for an entire regulatory scheme.
The court found that the legislature had, by implied consent, authorized
the state Personnel Board to regulate collective bargaining.' 7 In recognizing
implicit authority to regulate in this area, the court relied on the broad
delegation of discretionary authority conferred upon the board in the

Personnel Act3" and on the board's own actions to limit and define that

power.3 9
The conflict in Local 2238 arose with a challenge from Attorney General
Hal Stratton that, although public employees have engaged in collective
bargaining for many years, they do so without express legislative consent. 40

33. Id. at 282-83, 756 P.2d at 562-63. The applicable provision reads:
If at any time subsequent to the applicable review period provided for as to a
workmen's compensation insurance filing the superintendent finds that a filing does
not meet the applicable requirements of Chapter 59A, Article 17 NMSA 1978, he
shall, after a hearing upon written notice specifying the matters to be considered
at the hearing to every insurer and rate service organization which made such filing,
issue an order specifying the respects in which he finds that the filing fails to meet
such requirements and stating when, within a reasonable period thereafter, such
filing shall be deemed no longer effective. The superintendent shall send copies of
such order to every such insurer and rate service organization. The order shall not
affect any contract or policy made or issued prior to expiration of the period stated
in the order.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-17-14(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
34. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-17-14(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
35. NCCI, 107 N.M. at 283, 756 P.2d at 563. The court stated: "Unless any intent of the
legislature to the contrary be expressly stated, we cannot infer that powers authorized under Section
59A-17-14(B) for the Superintendent could be exercised only by him to the exclusion of the Board."
Id. Appellant in this case also asserted procedural defects in the SCC's adjudicatory hearing. Id.
at 283-87, 756 P.2d at 563-67. These issues are discussed in Part II of this article. See infra text
accompanying notes 138-54. This case is also included in our analysis of whole record review. See
infra text accompanying notes 243-47.
36. 108 N.M. 163, 769 P.2d 76 (1989).
37. Id. at 171, 769 P.2d at 84.
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-9-1 to -25 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
39. Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 170, 769 P.2d at 83.
40. Id. at 168, 769 P.2d at 81. This question had arisen before. In 1965, the supreme court
allowed the Town of Farmington to renew a collectively bargained agreement with unionized workers
at an electric utility that had previously been privately managed and had only recently been acquired
by the town. International Bd. of Elec. Workers v. Farmington, 75 N.M. 393, 405 P.2d 233 (1965).
Four years later, then Attorney General James Maloney cited the decision in Farmington to support
an opinion that public employees had implicit legislative permission to bargain on issues not covered
by existing municipal merit systems. 69 Op. Att'y Gen. 113 (1969). This opinion suggests that to
bargain on issues already covered by municipal merit systems would represent an abdication of the
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In Local 2238, the supreme court ruled that authority for public sector

collective bargaining is incident to the express grant4 of authority conferred
upon the Personnel Board in the Personnel Act. '
The court first addressed whether authority to allow and regulate
collective bargaining could legitimately be delegated. 42 The court held that
this public duty could be delegated so long as the Personnel Board
retained ultimate discretion and control over the collective bargaining

process .41
Finding the delegation acceptable, the court embarked upon a threepronged analysis of the scope of the board's delegated powers. First, the
court examined the language of the Personnel Act. 44 The court found
that the Personnel Board has broad discretionary authority to "provide
'45
greater economy and efficiency in the management of state affairs,
that language allowing the board to promulgate rules for employeemanagerial relations "among other things" was sufficiently broad to

encompass collective bargaining, 46 and that the board has
a duty to
'47
"promulgate regulations to effectuate the Personnel Act."

legislative discretion imparted to municipalities. Id.
In 1972, the Personnel Board promulgated Rules for Labor-Management Relations, which define
the scope of collective bargaining and establish procedures for negotiation. Local 2238, 108 N.M.
at 166-67, 769 P.2d at 79-80. In intervening years, the legislature has voted on matters related to
collective bargaining, but has stopped short of expressly affirming the Personnel Board's authority
to promulgate and apply rules in this area. Id.
Since Farmington, the courts have addressed other questions relating to collective bargaining. See
AFSCME, Local 2183 v. State Personnel Bd., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2397 (1972); City of Albuquerque
v. Campos, 86 N.M. 488, 525 P.2d 848 (1974).
The present dispute arose when the Attorney General refused to approve a proposed collective
bargaining agreement between the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) and the state highway department. Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 164, 769 P.2d at 77.
Subsequently, the Personnel Board terminated the agreement. Id. AFSCME brought this action for
writ of certiorari and declaratory judgment, asking that the existing collective bargaining agreement
be extended and that the Attorney General's objections be invalidated. Id.
One month after the suit was brought, the Attorney General issued a lengthy analysis on the
question, concluding that state agencies covered by the Personnel Act may not engage in collective
bargaining. 87 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 41 (Aug. 10, 1987). The supreme court acknowledged this opinion
in its decision in Local 2238, but found that it was not in accord with the case law or prior
attorney general opinions. Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 169, 769 P.2d at 82.
41. Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 171, 769 P.2d at 84.,In so doing, the court declined to follow
the majority of jurisdictions which require express statutory authority for collective bargaining. Id.
at 167, 769 P.2d at 80.
42. Id.at 170, 769 P.2d at 83.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 168-69, 769 P.2d at 81-82.
45. Id. at 168, 769 P.2d at 81; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
46. Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 169, 769 P.2d at 82; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-13 (Repl. Pamp.
1987).
47. Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 168, 769 P.2d 81; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-10(A) (Repl.
Pamp. 1987). The court also reviewed section 10-9-7 of the Personnel Act, which requires specific
legislative approval for rules, policies or plans which would have significant financial impact. See
Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 170-71, 769 P.2d at 83-84; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-7 (Repl.
Pamp. 1987). The court noted that collective bargaining agreements can only commit funds that
have already been appropriated and concluded that the strict procedures in the Rules for Labor
Management Relations fully protect the legislature's appropriations power. Local 2238, 108 N.M.
at 171, 769 P.2d at 84.
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Second, the court listed legislative actions which suggest that the legislature is aware that collective bargaining exists in the public sector.4
The court concluded that the legislature's failure to direct the board not
to promulgate rules in this area represented "de facto" approval of
collective bargaining. 49 Finally, the court examined the system of rules
promulgated by the board and found that they operate fairly within the
limits of the authority granted to the board.50
There is a hint of irony in the court's analysis. It is possible that the
existence of a regulatory framework for collective bargaining helped the
court reach the conclusion that collective bargaining was valid under the
authority granted to the Personnel Board. By assuming the authority to
promulgate rules in this area, it may be that the board created the kind
of defined regulatory environment which helps sustain the validity of
delegations of legislative power.'
B.

Adjudicatory Actions
In three cases dealing with license revocations5 2 the courts construed
the applicable statutes as a means of reviewing agencies' exercise of their
adjudicatory power.
In Molina v. McQuinn,5 3 the supreme court upheld the Board of
Examiner's two-week suspension of an optometrist's license for prescribing
a topical ocular agent without state certification to do so. 54 The district
court had concluded that the board exceeded its authority in suspending
the license.55 On appeal, however, the supreme court held that the board
56
had the authority to grant the optometrist a prehearing continuance.
Turning to the statute governing certification, the court found that the
requirements for certification were unambiguous 57 and had clearly not
been met by the optometrist.5" The supreme court reversed the district

48. Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 166-67, 769 P.2d at 79-80.
49. Id. at 167, 769 P.2d at 80. The court stated: "Thus, it is quite apparent that the legislature
has recognized and condoned collective bargaining without taking the positive step of official
recognition. It has 'de facto' recognized collective bargaining in the public sector." Id.
50. Id. at 170, 769 P.2d at 83. The court also noted that collective bargaining in the public
sector is quite different from private sector negotiations, as salaries, job classifications, and some
benefits are not subject to bargaining. Id.
51. The court implied that delegation was proper so long as the board retained discretion and
control. Id.
52. Molina v. McQuinn, 107 N.M. 384, 758 P.2d 798 (1988); Cordova v. Mulholland, 107 N.M.
659, 763 P.2d 368 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 546, 761 P.2d 424 (1988); Claridge v. State
Racing Comm'n, 107 N.M. 632, 763 P.2d 66 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d
200 (1988).
53. 107 N.M. 384, 758 P.2d 798 (1988).
54. Id. at 387, 758 P.2d at 801.
55. Id. at 385, 758 P.2d at 799.
56. Id. The court seemed to excuse the board certain flaws in its procedure, and it also noted
that the record below was incomplete. Id.
57. Id. at 386, 758 P.2d at 800.
58. Id. In reading the applicable statute, the court concluded that the state is to certify qualified
optometrists, but does not have the duty to seek out newly qualified optometrists. Id. Rather, newly
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court judgment and upheld the penalty imposed by the board. 9
The court of appeals examined both the language and the intent of
the controlling driver's license revocation statute in Cordova v. Mul-

holland 0 The petitioner in this case was a New Mexico driver whose
license was revoked for refusing to submit to a blood or breath test

after being stopped by a police officer. 6' The applicable statute requires
three things: the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
the driver was intoxicated; the driver refused to take the test although
informed of the consequences of refusal; and the driver was arrested. 62
The driver in Cordova argued that the last two requirements were exclusive, such that his arrest had to arise from some offense other than
his refusal to comply with the alcohol testing. 63 The court found no64

statutory basis for concluding that the elements were mutually exclusive.

The court concluded that such a restrictive reading of the statute would
' 65
"do violence both to the express language of the Act and to its purpose
to deter drunk driving. The court upheld the one-year suspension of

Cordova's driver's license. 66
In the third license revocation case, however, the courts were faced
with an admittedly ambiguous statute. 67 The dispute in Claridge v. State
Racing Commission6 arose over new measures for the post-race testing
of race horses. 69 The new tests had revealed the illegal use of synthetic
qualified optometrists have the responsibility to submit their credentials to the state. Id.
The applicable statute reads:
C. The board shall issue certification for the use of topical ocular pharmaceutical
agents to optometrists who have successfully completed an examination and submitted
proof of having satisfactorily completed a course in pharmacology as applied to
optometry, with particular emphasis on the application of pharmaceutical agents
for the purpose of examination of the human eye, analysis of ocular functions and
treatment of visual defects or abnormal conditions of the human eye and its adnexa.
The course shall constitute a minimum of one hundred five classroom-clinical hours
of instruction in general and ocular pharmacology, including therapeutic pharmacology, as applied to optometry, and shall be taught by an accredited institution
and approved by the board.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-2-10(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
59. Molina, 107 N.M. at 387, 758 P.2d at 801. The court also rejected the optometrist's argument
that judicial construction of the statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 38687, 758 P.2d at 800-01.
60. 107 N.M. 659, 763 P.2d 368 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 546, 761 P.2d 424 (1988).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 660, 763 P.2d at 369; see New Mexico Implied Consent Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
66-8-105 to -112 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
63. Cordova, 107 N.M. at 659, 763 P.2d at 368.
64. Id. at 660, 763 P.2d at 369.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Claridge v. State Racing Comm'n, 107 N.M. 632, 639, 763 P.2d 66, 73 (Ct. App. 1988),
cert. denied sub nor. Hill v. New Mexico State Racing Comm'n, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200
(1988). Here, the court of appeals was faced with two conflicting district court decisions. The
district court of Valencia County had issued a preliminary injunction restraining the commission
from using test results derived in this new manner. The district court of Santa Fe County had
upheld the commission's suspensions based on the new tests. Claridge, 107 N.M. at 633, 763 P.2d
at 67.
68. 107 N.M. 632, 763 P.2d 66 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988).
69. Id. at 634-35, 763 P.2d at 68-69.
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narcotics and led the State Racing Commission ("SRC") to revoke the
racing licenses of several New Mexico horsemen. 0
The horsemen argued that the New Mexico Horse Racing Act 7' prohibited the kind of out-of-state and unofficial testing performed by the
SRC.7 2 The court disagreed, finding that the statute was silent as to the
particularities of testing73 and that the law clearly conferred discretionary
authority upon the SRC to implement new measures to test for illegal
drugs because
these actions would serve the legislative purpose of ensuring
74
fair racing.
These cases reveal that when a state agency has been delegated authority
to serve a legislative end, the courts may not require an express statutory
basis for each agency action. The courts have repeatedly been willing to
rely on express delegations of discretionary authority to uphold agency
decisions.
To recall, in National Council on Compensation Insurance v. State
CorporationCommission,75 the court construed the New Mexico insurance
statutes to enable the state Insurance Board to make decisions on ratemaking.7 6 In Claridge v. State Racing Commission,7 7 the court found
that authority for implementing new drug testing procedures was implied
within the discretionary authority conferred upon the Racing Commission.7 1 In Local 2238 of the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees v. Stratton,79 the court found implied legislative
consent sufficient to justify an entire regulatory scheme. s0
The judicial acceptance of agency discretionary authority may bespeak
an interest in administrative efficiency, such that an administrative board
and not just a single individual may process insurance rate filings. 8 ' Or
the courts may have policy reasons for recognizing implied authority,
preferring, for example, the status quo of implied legislative consent for
collective bargaining to a state-wide disruption of labor-management relationships."2 It is also possible that increasing deference to agency gov-

70. Id. The commission had changed its usual practice of performing only in-state drug testing
of the horses' urine. After participating in an out-of-state pilot program of testing for synthetic
narcotics, the commission developed a priority system for post-race chemical testing and identified
the group of drug-tainted specimens. Id.
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1-1 to -23 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
72. Claridge, 107 N.M. at 636, 763 P.2d at 70.
73. Id. at 637, 763 P.2d at 71.
74. Id. As construed by the court, the statute requires only that the commission's official chemist
be employed by a New Mexico agency or laboratory and places no limitations on where the actual
testing can take place. Id.
75. 107 N.M. 278, 756 P.2d 558 (1988).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
77. 107 N.M. 632, 763 P.2d 66 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 413, 759 P.2d 200 (1988).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
79. 108 N.M. 163, 769 P.2d 76 (1989).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 36-51.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 36-51. The court in Local 2238 stated:
[W]e are aware that collective bargaining in the public sector has been in existence
in New Mexico for approximately seventeen years without an express grant of
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ernance is the quid pro quo for the courts' tendency to apply more
stringent, less deferential forms of judicial review. Parts II and III of
this article examine more closely the courts' increasing preference for
whole record review of agency decisions.
II.

EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

Administrative procedure is as important to the law as civil or criminal
procedure because state agencies have broad and pervasive effects on the
lives of state citizens. If the courts were to ignore how agencies do their
job or simply assume that agencies act appropriately, agency power would
be abandoned to its own devices.83
Procedure is a large factor in both agency rulemakings and adjudications. The courts are well-equipped to review agency procedure and
are properly less deferential to procedures developed by agencies than
they would be to procedure mandated by the legislature. The following
section examines judicial decisions concerning proper procedure in agency
rulemaking, ratemaking, and adjudication.
Rules and Rulemaking
A state agency sits as a quasi-legislative body when it generates rules
84
to guide prospective situations affecting more than one person or dispute.
Rulemaking is considered an efficient way to make law: it establishes
the rules ahead of time and allows for policymaking on a broader scope
than a case-by-case adjudicatory process.8 5 Rulemaking dominates over
adjudication as state agencies' primary means of making policy. 6 A
rulemaker, however, may not foresee all of the prospective applications
of a new rule and its effects on citizens' substantive rights. For this
reason, and to avoid court challenges to agency rules whenever possible,
state agencies apply rulemaking procedures to ensure that those affected
by prospective rules are informed of the intent to make rules and have
an opportunity to voice their concerns.

A.

legislative authority. Thus, the challenge by the attorney general to its existence
was not inappropriate. But we are also compelled to look at this issue realistically,
and are mindful that we cannot, without grave injustice and harm, turn back the
hands of time.
Local 2238, 108 N.M. at 168, 769 P.2d at 81.
83. Justice Felix Frankfurter simply asserted that "[t]he history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347
(1943).
84. See Browde, Administrative Law, 12 N.M.L. REV. 1, 21 (1982).
85. See H. LINDE, G. BUNN, F. PAFF & W. CHURCH, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES
829-30 (2d ed. 1981).
86. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.3, at 149 (1976); see also E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 237-39 (2d ed. 1981). The modern view preferring
policy by rule rather than by adjudication is not blind to the disadvantages of using rulemaking
to implement policy. Writing a general rule is no easy matter and is often more difficult than
deciding a case. The likelihood of producing both unintended and undesirable results is greater.
Proposing general rules may inspire concerted opposition. If complex rulemaking procedures are in
place, promulgating a rule can be more costly in time, effort, and good will than deciding a group
of cases. E. GALLHORN & B. BOYER, supra, at 237-39.
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Procedures for agency rulemaking should put affected parties on notice

and provide the opportunity to be heard before an agency position becomes
law.1 7 In general, agency procedure is subject to judicial review regardless
of whether the procedures were strictly outlined by statute or left to

agency discretion." In the case of Tenneco Oil Co. v. New Mexico Water
Quality Control Commission,89 the New Mexico Court of Appeals examined and upheld the rulemaking procedure of the state's Water Quality

Control Commission ("the Commission ").9
The dispute arose over new regulations setting standards for levels of
certain pollutants in the state's groundwater. 9' The regulations were promulgated under the state Water Quality Act, 92 which created the Commission
and delegated to it authority to protect groundwater. When these regulations were promulgated, the statute expressly directed the Commission
to consider the practical and economic effects of new standards and the

customary uses of the water. 93

Two gas production companies challenged the adoption of the pollution
regulations. 94 They asserted that the Commission had failed to consider

87. E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, supra note 86, at 237-39.
88. The federal Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976), authorizes
a reviewing court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action ...

found to be ...

arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" and to set aside agency
action found to be "without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D)
(1976). An agency rulemaking done outside of or without required procedure is logically an abuse
of discretion. Proving procedural infirmity in a direct way proves an abuse of discretion and can
invalidate the rule. The practical difference is the degree of judicial deference given the ultimate
decision versus the deference given the procedure used to get there. The problem arises when the
enabling statute requires consideration of particular facts or particular findings, gathered through
an unspecified hearing process, with procedure, by omission, left to agency discretion. The general
rule is that matters left to agency discretion by the legislature are less reviewable and can only be
set aside if arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. But, if the statute calls for a hearing
and consideration of particular facts, courts appear to be confident enough to judge the difference
between good and bad hearing procedure even absent specific legislative direction. See generally
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
89. Tenneco Oil Co. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, 107 N.M. 469, 760 P.2d
161 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 714, 749 P.2d 99 (1988).
90. Id. at 477, 760 P.2d at 169.
91. Id. at 471, 760 P.2d at 163. Earlier, Tenneco Oil Company and Navajo Refining lost a

motion to stay enforcement of the new numerical standards while the issues in the case were under
appeal. Tenneco Oil Co. v. New Mexico Water Control Comm'n, 105 N.M. 708, 736 P.2d 986
(Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 714, 749 P. 2d 99 (1988). See Kelly & Gilmore, Administrative
Law, 19 N.M.L. Rav. 575 (1989), for a discussion of the standards to be applied in considering
a stay of enforcement during such an appeal.
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-6-1 to -4, 74-6-6 to -13 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
93. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 471, 760 P.2d at 163 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-7(D) (Repl.
Pamp. 1986)). The statute required the Commission to examine six factors: (1) injury to or interference
with health, welfare and property; (2) the public interest, including social and economic value of
the sources of water contaminants; (3) technical practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing
or eliminating the contaminants; (4) successive uses; (5) feasibility of a user or subsequent user
treating the water; (6) property rights and accustomed uses. Id. at 472, 760 P.2d at 164. The gas
production companies claimed the record did not contain evidence of the Commission's consideration
of factors two through six. The Commission responded that all factors were considered and that
the Commission gave each factor the weight deemed appropriate in reaching the final decision. Id.
at 471, 760 P.2d at 163. There is no longer a requirement of consideration of these six factors by
the Water Quality Control Commission. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-6-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
94. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 470, 760 P.2d at 162.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

all of the factors listed in the statute, 95 had failed to provide an adequate

statement of reasons for the new standards or a scientific reference for
the standards, 96 and had altered the public record of the agency rulemaking. 97 In light of the alleged procedural deficiencies, the companies
charged that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion, not in accordance98 with the law, and not supported

by substantial evidence in the record.
Any such finding would provide a sufficient basis to invalidate the

regulations. 99 However, the appellate court examined the entire administrative
record of the rulemaking,100 applying a whole record standard of review, 10

95. Id. at 471, 760 P.2d at 163.
96. Id. at 474, 760 P.2d 166.
97. Id. at 475, 760 P.2d at 167.
98. Id. at 471, 760 P.2d at 163.
99. Id. at 473, 760 P.2d at 165. The Water Quality Act was codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
74-6-1 to -4, 74-6-6 to -13 (Repl. Pamp. 1986). Section 74-6-7(A) stated then and now that "appeals
shall be upon the record made at the hearing" and that the regulation should be set aside under
section 74-6-7(C) if "(1) arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion; (2) not supported by
substantial evidence in the record . . . or (3) otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. The court
of appeals and the parties agreed that this language set forth the standard of review. There have
been changes to the Water Quality Act since Tenneco was-decided. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 746-1 to -4, 74-6-6 to -13 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
100. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 471, 760 P.2d at 163. In this case, the record covered three days of
public hearing and two days of public meeting on the proposed regulations in September and
December of 1985. Id. at 470, 760 P.2d at 162.
101. Id. at 477, 760 P.2d at 169. The whole record substantial evidence standard has been described
as "a less deferential standard than the 'traditional' substantial evidence standard." See Browde,
supra note 10, at 527 n.17, 549-52; see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 47791 (1951). For a further discussion of the scope and standards of judicial review, see infra text
accompanying notes 240-97. The term "whole record" as used by the court of appeals in Tenneco
refers more to the sources of the information that make up the record under review than to the
standard of judicial review and deference applied to agency rulemaking. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 477,
760 P.2d at 169.
The "traditional" substantial evidence test was less exhaustive than a whole record review because
evidence was viewed in the light most favorable to the agency action. See Rinker v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 627, 506 P.2d 783, 784 (1973). Furthermore, the court would not weigh
conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Lujan v. Pendaries Properties, Inc., 96
N.M. 771, 774, 635 P.2d 580, 583 (1981). The court's deference under a substantial evidence test
would go so far as to ignore contrary evidence against the agency decision. See United Veterans
Orgs. v. Property Appraisal Dep't, 84 N.M. 114, 118, 500 P.2d 199, 203 (Ct. App. 1972). Each
of these statements indicates that something less than all of the evidence in the record should be
considered or given weight by a reviewing court. In Tenneco, the court of appeals sought to review
the entire administrative record not for the purpose of considering evidence contrary to the decision,
but to find evidence of all the factors required by statute to be considered. 107 N.M. at 477, 760
P.2d at 169.
The Water Quality Act, both at the time Tenneco was decided and now, provides for judicial
review of regulations and states 'appeals shall be upon the record made at the hearing." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 74-6-7(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986). The court was compelled to decide what constituted
the record because one party opposing the standards (Navajo Refining Company) argued that
pursuant to the language above and the Open Meetings Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-15-1 to -4
(Repl. Pamp. 1987), a public body may deliberate and vote only at a public meeting. Therefore,
only the transcript and minutes of the public meeting where the Commission voted to adopt the
regulations constituted the record subject to review. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 471, 760 P.2d at 163.
The assumption was that not all statutory factors were considered at the two day public meeting
and therefore the regulations were not properly adopted. The Commission and Tenneco Oil relied
on the statute and Duke City Lumber Co. v. New MexicoEnvtl. Improvement Bd., 101 N.M 291,
681 P.2d 717 (1984), to support judicial review based on the entire administrative record, including
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and found that the Commission had used the proper process to reach its

decision.

2
0

The court's search of the entire record revealed that the Commission
had considered all six statutory factors. 013 Then the court addressed the
companies' allegation that the Commission's statement of reasons for
adopting the new standards was untimely. 1°4 The plaintiffs asserted that
the Commission's statement of reasons was simply a post hoc rationalization for its action because it was compiled after the Commission
voted to adopt the numerical standards and because it contained "assertions that had not been articulated by the Commission."' 05
In earlier cases involving the Water Quality Control Commission, New
Mexico courts held that the Commission's record had to indicate its
reasoning and basis for adopting regulations even though formal findings
were not specifically required. 106 The United States Supreme Court has
stated that such a statement of reasons is a simple but fundamental rule
of administrative law and that "the orderly functioning of the process
of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency
7
acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.'"
The court in Tenneco concluded that the Commission's statement of
reasons was adequate because it had been "compiled, edited and adopted
before the regulations were filed."' 0 The court held that the statement
of reasons prepared after the agency's vote was not procedural error so
long as the statement was adopted prior to formal filing. 109

the three day public hearing and the two day public meeting. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 471, 760 P.2d
at 163.
The court recognized that Duke City involved an adjudication rather than a rulemaking and yet
held that Duke City's "express application of the whole record standard of judicial review to
findings of fact made by administrative agencies in general controls where the Commission acts in
its rule-making capacity." Id. The court found additional support for whole record judicial review
of the Commission's rulemaking because of the same "appeal shall be upon the record made at
the hearing" language in the Water Quality Act and the Air Quality Control Act, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 74-2-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1983), under which Duke City was decided. The New Mexico appellate
court appears to be extending whole record substantial evidence review to the legislative-like function
of agency rulemaking if the enabling statute contains the language "upon the record made at the
hearing." See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) for a discussion of the
federal applicability of "on the record" and "after hearing" language to trigger the need for more
trial-type hearings rather than notice and comment procedure.
102. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 477, 760 P.2d at 169.
103. Id. at 473, 760 P.2d at 165.
104. Id.at 474, 760 P.2d at 166.
105. Id. Post hoc rationalizations are considered explanations of counsel for administrative decisions
not employed by the agency and subsequent to the occurrence of administrative action being reviewed.
Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1009 (D. Del. 1975). Rationalizations of this kind may not be
accepted by the courts. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
106. Bokum Resources Corp. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, 93 N.M. 546,
552-53, 603 P.2d 285, 291-92 (1979) (while the Commission's reasoning and basis for adopting
regulations should be indicated there is no requirement for formal findings); City of Roswell v.
New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, 84 N.M. 561, 563, 505 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 560, 505 P.2d 1236 (1973) (there is no statutory requirement that the
Commission make formal findings when rulemaking).
107. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
108. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 474, 760 P. 2d at 166.
109. Id. In respect to rulenlaking, the federal APA requires that "[a]fter consideration of the
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Another procedural issue raised in Tenneco was a claim that the
Commission had failed to provide the parties with basic data, specifically
0
a "single key reference" scientifically justifying the pollution standards."
The Commission had apparently offered six scientific authorities for review
by the parties and had argued that the water quality issues were too
complicated to rely on just one key reference."' The court found that
the parties had had ample opportunity to present evidence 2and question
the data on which the Commission's decision was based."
Finally, it was alleged that the Commission had illegally altered the
minutes of one public meeting in order to obscure the public record as
to whether the statutory mandate had been met." 3 While the draft of
minutes to an earlier meeting was under review, a Commissioner offered
an alternate way to phrase a comment made by the chair of the Commission reflecting the amending Commissioner's understanding of the
chairman's comment. The phrase was incorporated in the minutes as
proposed by the Commissioner. 1 4 Because both comments and the change
to the minutes appeared verbatim in the transcript of record, the court
found no alteration obscuring the public record." 5
In Tenneco, the New Mexico Court of Appeals found the agency's
fact gathering and comment procedure sufficient to provide affected
parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as an
opportunity to take evidence, on all the statutory factors required in a
water quality rulemaking." 6 Tenneco also reveals the willingness of the
courts to apply a whole record standard of review to agency rulemakings,
not just to agency adjudications. 117 In this instance, the application of
broad whole record review enabled the court to include in the scope of
8
its analysis the evidence necessary to uphold the pollution regulations.",
In other words, the less deferential and more rigorous standard of judicial
review employed in Tenneco had the result of sustaining an agency's
action. 119

Tenneco raises the question, however, as to whether an agency's failure
to consider one factor mandated by statute would constitute an abuse
relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement
of their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). Courts may imply a requirement that an
agency provide an explanation from the enabling statute. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571
(1975). In order to review an agency action, a court may require an explanation of what an agency
has done and why. Citizens Comm. of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n of D.C., 477 F.2d 402,
408 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The purpose of this requirement is to assure that the fact finder will carefully
evaluate the evidence and consider the discretionary opinions, to give the courts a way to determine
the basis of agency action, and to allow parties the necessary information to seek review. Dunlop,
421 U.S. at 573.
110. Tenneco, 107 N.M. at 476, 760 P.2d at 168.

111. Id.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

474, 760 P.2d at
474-75, 760 P.2d
475, 760 P.2d at
477, 760 P.2d at
471, 760 P.2d at
476, 760 P.2d at
477. 760 P.2d at

166.
at 166-67.
167.
169.
163.
168.
169.
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of discretion or a reversible procedural infirmity.' 20 The court's application
of whole record review, used in this instance to uphold an agency action,
might in the future make agency regulations more vulnerable to challenge
in the courts. The broader and more comprehensive review of agency
rulemaking increases the risk of the court concentrating on contrary
evidence brought in by outside parties and unearthing procedural flaws
in the agency's effort to develop regulations.
Tenneco alerts rulemakers that the courts can examine the entire administrative record of their rulemakings. Agency procedures to hear evidence and build a substantial and clean record, then, take on greater
2
significance.' '
One device that may help agencies strengthen their rulemaking procedure
is the new state registry for agency rules instituted by the state legislature
in March of 1989 and currently being published twice a month. 22 During
the spring 1989 session, the New Mexico Legislature amended the State
Rules Act 23 to institute an official registry for state agency rules and
decisions.' 24 The new section provides that "[t]he New Mexico register
shall be the official publication for all notices of rule makings and filings
of adopted rules, including emergency rules, by agencies.' ' 25

120. Id. at 471-73, 760 P.2d at 163-65.
121. The holding may be limited to rulemaking under statutes containing language about review
upon "the record made at the hearing" and authorization to set aside regulations "not supported
by substantial evidence in the record." Id. at 471, 760 P.2d at 163. For a discussion of the difference
between adjudicatory and rulemaking procedure and the importance of the administrative record,
see Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
824 (1978). The court in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League said:
The presumption in rule making cases is that formal adjudicatory procedures are
not necessary. A hearing serves a very different function in the rule making context.
Witnesses may bring in new information or different points of view, but the agency's
final decision need not reflect the public input. The witnesses are not the only
source of evidence on which the Administrator may base his factual findings....
With respect to rule making ... a statutory provision that rules be issued
after a hearing, without more, should not be construed as requiring agency
action "on the record," but rather as merely requiring an opportunity for
expression of views. That conclusion was based on the legislative nature of
rule making, from which it was inferred, unless a statute requires otherwise,
that an agency hearing on proposed rules would be similar to a hearing
before a legislative committee, with neither the legislature nor the agency
being limited to the material adduced at the hearing.
Id. at 877-78 (quoting in part ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT 42-43 (1947)).
Courts are generally not free to require additional procedure, such as oral argument or crossexamination, for fear that hearing requirements in informal rulemaking would be so uncertain as
to cause agencies either to avoid rulemaking or to hold trial-type hearings in all cases and thereby
stultify the administrative process. See Vermont-Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Trial-type procedure is contrasted with notice and comment
procedure, which provides for interested parties to participate in the rulemaking process by submitting
written data or arguments. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-7.1 (Supp. 1989).
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-24 to -25, 14-4-1 to -9 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
124. 1989 N.M. Laws 241-42.
125. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-7.1(B) (Supp. 1989).
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The section emphasizes two things: that the publication of the register
be economically feasible 26 and that editorial control remain with the
agencies and the state records administrator. 27 In June of 1989, the State
Records Center and Archives issued a request for proposals seeking a
publisher for the register, 128 and in September it gained the Governor's
approval for the publisher of Capitol Government Reports to publish
the register. 29 The register will be funded by subscription fees,. a column
inch charge to the agencies, and advertising.' 0
Approximately 875 rules are promulgated and adopted by some 125
New Mexico agencies every year.' 3 ' Rules are filed with and copies are
held by the State Records Center and Archives,' 3 2 but information re33
garding new rules has not been broadly disseminated around the state.
The register represents a significant development in New Mexico administrative law. Beginning in January 1990, state agencies will have
another avenue to provide notice of upcoming decisions and disseminate
information about hearings. Even more important, New Mexicans will
have access to a comprehensive publication of proposed and adopted
state rules.
Ratemaking
State regulatory commissions can impose rates of payment for certain
goods and services, like electric power and workers' compensation in-

B.

126. Id. Paragraph (A) of § 14-4-7.1 states that "[the state records administrator shall provide,
... The
if economically feasible, for development and publication of a New Mexico register.
legislature appropriated no funds for the register, requiring that the publication pay for itself through
sales, subscriptions, charges for notices, and advertising. Request for Proposals for Publication of
the New Mexico Register 3 (June 30, 1989) (available at the New Mexico State Records Center and
Archives) [hereinafter Request for Proposals].
127. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-7.1(B) (Supp. 1989). Paragraph (B) continues: "The register may
include the text of any or all proposed rules and adopted rules, including emergency rules, in full
or in part at the discretion and agreement of the issuing agency and the state records administrator."
Id.
128. Request for Proposals, supra note 126.
129. The arrangement was discussed with the Governor and his Cabinet on September 25, 1989.
At that meeting, the Governor pledged the participation of the agencies of the executive branch
and expressed his intention to publish gubernatorial proclamations and appointments in the register.
Telephone interview with John Muchmore, Special Project Analyst for the New Mexico State Records
Center (Apr. 1990). There are approximately 54 executive orders and 342 gubernatorial appointments
each year. Request for Proposals, supra note 126. At the September meeting, the Attorney General
also agreed to use the register, as did the Public Service Commission. Telephone interview with
John Muchmore, supra. Paragraph (D) of the new section provides the basis for the inclusion of
gubernatorial and attorney general decisions. That paragraph states:
The New Mexico register may include a summary or the text of any governor's
executive order, a summary, listing or the text of any attorney general's opinion,
a calendar listing the date, time and place of all or selected agency rule-making
hearings, a list of gubernatorial appointments of state officials and board and
commission members or other material related to administrative law and practice.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-7.1(D) (Supp. 1989).
130. The new rule authorizes the state records administrator to "provide for charges for subN.M. STAT.
scriptions and for publication of notice and other items, including advertising.
ANN. § 14-4-7.1(A) (Supp. 1989).
131. Request for Proposals, supra note 126.
132. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
133. New Mexico has never published a register for agency decisions, although at least 40 other
states publish one in some form. Request for Proposals, supra note 126.
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surance, which are vital to many of the state's residents. Ratemaking so
directly affects the profitability of the providers of these goods and
services that procedural tension is the norm.' 34 Procedural issues in, ratemaking are commonly disputed, and such issues provided an early
source of law in the administrative area.'
Before the advent of regulatory commissions, rates were controlled
more directly by legislatures through rate setting statutes.1 6 Courts historically deferred to the legislature in this area, and courts continue to
so defer, although to a much3 7lesser extent, to the authority of administrative agencies to set rates.

134. In a case in which an agency took official notice of facts not in the record, Justice Cardozo
described the rate setting and order of refunds by the commission as "condemnation without trial."
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300 (1937).
135. The famous Morgan cases, Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), and Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938), involved setting rates for the sale of livestock at a stockyard.
The Court appeared to equate a judicial model of decisionmaking with statutory requirements of
a full hearing and the fair procedure required by the due process clause. The drafters of the federal
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976), accepted the position of the
Morgan cases that a judicial decisionmaking model provides the appropriate procedural norm in a
wide area of administrative decisionmaking. Gifford, The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective View, 30
ADMIN. L. REV. 237, 241-42 (1978). After the Morgan decisions, however, it became apparent "that
the pristine judicial model by which the Court seemed to be guided was inappropriate for ratemaking
cases like the Morgan cases themselves, and perhaps was also inappropriate for other kinds of
highly technical and complex cases." Id. The drafters of the APA addressed the Morgan Court's
concerns that the decisionmaker be insulated from any official who had an adversary role in the
case and its concern about ex parte communications. The APA was "carefully drawn to exempt
rate and other economic regulatory decision-making from those provisions." Id. at 242. The procedural
tensions are manifest in the irony that judicial norms and procedures set out in early ratemaking
cases were widely accepted as proper for a host of administrative decisions, but eventually thought
not particularly proper for ratemaking.
136. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAUS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 278
(7th ed: 1979). Once ratemaking moved into the regulatory arena, the courts became more interested
with the procedure and results of fact finding. The legislative character of ratemaking has been
noted in Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Company, 410
U.S. 224 (1973) (due process does not apply to an order raising rates charged by all railroads).
Nonetheless, a complete review of the fact finding was the early standard. See, e.g., Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920) (setting rates is a legislative function, but
even if the legislature itself had set the rates, a reviewing court could determine whether the rate
confiscated property). Under the premise that unreasonable rates of return would confiscate property,
Ben Avon held that a reviewing court might exercise "independent judgment" with respect to the
confiscation issue. 253 U.S. at 289. The Ben Avon Court declared that a reviewing court could
come to an independent determination "as to both law and facts." Id. Later, the Supreme Court
affirmed the judicial exercise of independent judgment with respect to constitutional facts, such as
valuations of physical plants on which rates of return would be calculated, but would not require
a trial de novo and instead allow an independent review of the record made by the ratemaking
agency. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936). The more modern
judicial approach to ratemaking is concerned with the end result rather than the method and
procedure. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (there is no need for
courts to consider the methods used to set rates as long as the end result gave adequate compensation
to the utility).
137. It would be illogical to claim that administrative bodies created to assure fair and equal
rates can meet that obligation efficiently if their decisions are consistently delayed or left in limbo
while the judicial process continues. It is also much more efficient, in respect to planning and the
allocation of resources, for market participants to know what rates are currently in force and what
rates are likely to prevail in the future.
The courts willingly review and provide instruction on proper procedure for ratemaking. In
American Automobile Association v. State Corporation Commission, 95 N.M. 227, 620 P. 2d 881
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In two cases decided during this survey period, New Mexico courts
allowed state agencies discretionary flexibility in their ratemaking procedure. In the first case, the ratemakers were allowed to apply a less
formal procedure for notice and hearing than petitioners argued the
statute required. 138 In the second case, the ratemakers were permitted to
apply a stricter review process than the statute might have mandated,
assigning the burden of proof to an electric utility to defend its metering
practice. 3 9
In National Council on Compensation Insurance v. New Mexico State
Corporation Commission,140 a divided supreme court affirmed the cancellation of an increase in workers' compensation insurance rates. The
dispute involved the sequence of actions taken by the New Mexico State
Corporation Commission ("Corporation Commission") to cancel the rate
increase.'4'
The rate increase was proposed in a filing made to the state SuperInintendent of Insurance by the National Council on Compensation
142
State law' 43
surance ("NCCI"), an official rate service organization.
provides for a period of time during which a rate filing may be disapproved
by the Superintendent of Insurance in writing.'" When no written notice
45
was provided, the parties assumed that the filing had become effective.
Subsequently, the Corporation Commission, sitting as the Insurance
47
Board,'" held a hearing on the filing and canceled the increase.
NCCI alleged a due process violation in that the notice of the hearing
lacked the specificity required by the Insurance Code.'" The written notice
to NCCI indicated that the hearing would be informal, "to receive written

(1980), the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the Commission's rate setting for wrecker services
as not based on substantial evidence because the Commission did not "take a statewide sample"
to determine a "just and reasonable" rate. Id. at 229, 620 P.2d at 883. In effect, the court imposed
on the Commission a particular procedure (taking a state-wide sample) for decisionmaking necessary
to carry out the broad statutory duty to set reasonable rates. See Browde, Administrative Law, 12
N.M.L. REv. 73-74 (1982). Had the legislature set rates without taking a state-wide sample, it is
less certain that the court would have attacked a legislative finding that the rates were just and
reasonable.
138. National Council on Compensation Ins. v. New Mexico Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278, 756
P.2d 558 (1988).
139. Otero County Elec. Co-op. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 108 N.M. 462, 774 P.2d 1050 (1988).
140. 107 N.M. 278, 756 P.2d 558 (1988).
141. Id. at 280-81, 756 P.2d at 560-61. The court also addressed who had the authority to reject
proposed rate increases, the Insurance Board as a body, or the Superintendent alone. Id. at 28283, 756 P.2d at 562-63. This issue is discussed in Part I of this article. See supra text accompanying
notes 28-36.
The Insurance Rate Regulation Law is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Insurance Board,
composed of members of the State Corporation Commission and the appointed Superintendent of
Insurance. N.M. STAT ANN. §§ 59A-3-1 to -4, 59A-17-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
142. Id. §§ 59A-17-4(B), -19.
143. Id. §§ 59A-17-1 to 59A-53-17.
144. Id. § 59A-17-14.
145. NCCI, 107 N.M. at 281 n.2, 756 P.2d at 561 n.2.
146. Id. at 281, 756 P.2d at 561.
147. Id. at 281-82, 756 P.2d at 561-62.
148. Id. at 282, 756 P.2d at 562. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-17-14(B) provides that the superintendent
shall only issue an order "after a hearing upon written notice specifying the matters to be considered."
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and oral comments of interested persons concerning proposed .. . rate
increases. 1' 49 Furthermore, the record of the hearing contained dialogue
between NCCI's attorney and one Commissioner in which the two agreed
that the nature of the meeting would be informal. 5 0 After the meeting
had commenced, however, the same Commissioner announced' 5 that the
meeting would "proceed as if this is a formal rate hearing.' 1
A majority of the court was unconvinced by NCCI's due process
argument. The court found that a statement of legal issues submitted by
NCCI a week prior to the meeting "supports the reasonable inference
that NCCI was aware that the hearing could culminate in the approval
or disapproval of its rate filing.'1 2 NCCI, then, had ample practical
notice of the proceeding as indicated by its preparation and the evidence
it offered.
The court in NCCI allowed the Corporation Commission to disapprove
the rate filing with an order that was "sufficiently specific, if not quite
explicit,"'15 4 and upheld a procedure that changed at the last minute from
an informal information gathering to a formal rate hearing.' 55 The court
required only practical notice and a practical opportunity to participate
in the process, allowing the Corporation Commission flexibility in per56
forming its ratemaking duties.
In In re Otero County Electric Co-Op. v. New Mexico Public Service
Commission,' the supreme court heard a challenge to the fairness of
an electric utility's method of metering electricity use. Some of the utility's
customers had lodged complaints about the utility's practice of charging
customers surcharges for exceeding set peak usage amounts.' The Public
Service Commission ("PSC") held a separate hearing to review the fairness
of the practice. 5 9 The hearing examiner found that this demand metering
was discriminatory and not in accord with the statute.'60 The PSC affirmed
6
the hearing examiner's decision on administrative appeal.' '
On direct appeal to the supreme court, the utility contended that the
PSC erred in applying the strict process reserved for rate increase requests

149. NCCI, 107 N.M at 281 n.1, 756 P.2d at 561 n.l.
150. Id. at 291, 756 P.2d at 571 (Scarborough, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 285, 756 P.2d at 565.
153. Id. at 285-86, 756 P.2d at 565-66. The dissent clearly thought the notice given to NCCI
was inadequate and deprived NCCI of due process of law. Id. at 291, 756 P.2d at 571 (Scarborough,
J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 287, 756 P.2d at 567. NCCI alleged that four working days was not a reasonable
period of time in which to cure the filing's defects or seek judicial review. The court noted that
NCCI did have options that it did not pursue. Id. at 286, 756 P.2d at 566.
155. Id. at 284, 756 P.2d at 564.
156. Id. The notice identified the subject matter; therefore, the order disapproving the rate filing
was "consonant" with the subject matter addressed at the hearing. Id.
157. 108 N.M. 462, 774 P.2d 1050 (1989).
158. Id. at 463, 774 P.2d at 1051. Demand metering involved installing meters to track a customer's
usage and record that customer's peak demand. Should the customer's peak usage exceed a certain
level, the utility would add a surcharge to the customer's bill. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 464, 774 P.2d at 1052 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-8-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984)).
161. Id.
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rather than general guidelines for reviewing issues concerning rate structure. 62 The utility also charged that the PSC inappropriately severed the
issue of fairness from the more general rate request'6 3 and placed the
burden of proof to defend the metering practice on the utility.64 The
utility's asserted aim in demand metering was to cut individual customer

peaks. 161
The court affirmed the PSC action, holding that the strict statutory
procedure for rate increase requests embodied the general purpose of the
act to establish reasonable and just rates and that the PSC was free to
apply this procedure to the customers' complaints.'1 The court found
the PSC's severing of the fairness issue to be reasonable under the
statute,167 and also found that the PSC had discretionary authority to
place the burden of proof upon the utility. 68 The court reasoned that
the utility was on notice that it bore the burden of proof and was in
the best position to explain the fairness of the metering.1 69 The utility
had failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable connection between
individual electricity usage peaks and system-wide peaks, and it had also
failed to counter testimony by customers70 about the "disproportionate
and harsh" effects of demand metering.
Otero affirms that agencies possessing discretionary authority may apply
develop rules governing
stricter process than the statutes may require and
7
procedures for review and burden of proof.' '
C. Adjudications
Agency adjudications are quasi-judicial proceedings to "investigate,
declare and enforce liabilities as they stand on present or past facts under
laws supposed already to exist.' ' 72 State agencies hold hearings to decide
the substantive rights and liabilities of individual New Mexicans under
the law. Adjudications so directly affect the liberty and property interests

162. Id. at 464-65, 774 P.2d at 1052-53. The utility contended that demand metering was a rate
structure issue and therefore was controlled by the statute section concerning rates in general and
not the section dealing with rate increase requests. Id. at 464, 774 P.2d at 1052. The rate increase
request section sets forth "detailed procedures to be adhered to in a rate case," N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 62-8-7 (Supp. 1991), while the general rate section provides only that "[elvery rate made, demanded
or received by any public utility shall be just and reasonable." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-8-1 (Repl.
Pamp. 1984).
163. Otero, 108 N.M. at 464, 774 P.2d at 1052.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 463, 774 P.2d at 1051. The utility had to pay a premium for its peak demand and
was trying to recover this cost from customers contributing to the system-wide peak demand. Id.
166. Id. at 464-65, 774 P.2d at 1052-53. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-8-1 (Supp. 1991) contains the
general purpose of the utility rate statute, and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-8-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1984)
contains the specific procedures for rate changes.
167. Otero, 108 N.M. at 465, 774 P.2d 1053.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 466, 774 P.2d at 1054.
171. Id. at 463, 774 P.2d at 1051.
172. Browde, supra note 84, at 33-34 (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co:, 211 U.S. 210,
226 (1908) (Holmes, J.)).
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of individuals that agencies are required to give parties trial-like procedural
due process. 7 3 During this survey period, six appellate cases examined
questions concerning parties' notice and opportunity to be heard, access
to public information, and
the need for a statement of reasons backing
74
an adjudicatory decision.1
1. Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard
The obligation to afford affected parties notice and the opportunity
to be heard is rooted in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. 175 The principle underlying
due process is that a person's right and obligations under the law should
not be determined in a proceeding about which he or she has no notice
or say. 76 The specific procedural requirements, that is, exactly what and
how much process is due, may vary. 77 Besides protecting substantive
rights, procedural safeguards such as notice and hearing generate among
178
the parties the feeling that justice was served.
To be constitutional, notice to potentially affected parties must be
"reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections."' 7 This standard was established in the United
States Supreme Court decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.8 0 and affirmed in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,' 8'

173. Kelly & Gilmore, supra note 1, at 575, 599 nn. 171-73 and accompanying text. Trial-type
hearing procedures essentially include: (1) an impartial and competent tribunal; (2) the right of
parties to participate by entitlement to notice and opportunity to present proof and cross-examine
opposing witnesses; (3) a decision based on the record, consistent with accepted principles and
rationally explained; and (4) reviewability by an appellate court. Cramton, A Comment on TrialType Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 588 (1972).
174. Kleinberg v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 107 N.M. 38, 751 P.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1988); State
ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst, 106 N.M. 732, 749 P.2d 1111 (1988); Fulton v. Cornelius, 107 N.M.
362, 758 P.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1988); Spadaro v. University of N.M. Bd. of Regents, 107 N.M. 402,
759 P.2d 189 (1988); State ex rel. Blanchard v. City Comm'rs, 106 N.M. 769, 750 P.2d 469 (Ct.
App. 1988); Green v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, 107 N.M. 628, 762 P.2d 915 (Ct. App.
1988).
175. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
176. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
177. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). "The very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation." Id.
178. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951), suggested two reasons for notice and hearing:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss, notice of the case against him and opportunity
to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling so important
to a popular government, that justice has been done.
Id. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Operationally, "[elven a totalitarian form of government
might well provide for hearings in order to better implement the social policies that its laws reflect."
Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 454 (1974).
179. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citing Millken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).
180. Id.
181. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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which emphasized the importance of giving
adequate notice in cases
m2
involving property sold in state tax sales.
In Fulton v. Cornelius'3 and State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst,114
New Mexico courts addressed tax sale and notice issues. In Fulton, the
court of appeals stated that a tax sale can only be valid if constitutional
and statutory due process requirements are met.' 5 The sale occurred in
this instance when the grandson of a property owner failed to pay taxes
on the property after the owner died.'8 6 The grandson had notified the
county of his status as the decedent's personal representative.' 7 Even so,
notices of tax due and, eventually, of the tax sale, were sent to the
decedent's out-of-state address, rather than to the grandson.' 8 The trial
court entered an order quieting title in favor of the purchaser, and the
grandson appealed. '8 9
The court of appeals found the tax sale invalid for lack of notice,
concluding that if tax officials have reason to know that a property
owner has died, they must make reasonable efforts to locate and notify
the decedent's personal representative. 19 Here, reasonable efforts to provide notice had not been made.' 9 The court also established that tax
officials could be put. on notice of such a change
in ownership by their
92
own records and records of the district court.'
In State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst,'93 the supreme court declared
that notice by publication and "red-[tagging]" of the residential property
to be sold did not fulfill the statutory notice requirements. 194 The court
did not decide whether such notice would comport with due process, 195
but declared that the tax sales statute was in substance a forfeiture statute
and therefore was to be construed strictly against forfeiture.' 96
In Klineline, notice of the impending tax sale of a residential property
was sent by certified letter to the home, but was destroyed and unheeded
by the wife, who was mentally ill.' 97 The return receipt was received by
the state marked "unclaimed," and the state proceeded with the sale.' 98

182. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
183. 107 N.M. 362, 758 P.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1988).
184. 106 N.M. 732, 749 P.2d 1111 (1988).
185. Fulton, 107 N.M. at 366, 758 P.2d at 316.
186. Id.at 363, 758 P.2d at 313.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.at 364, 758 P.2d at 314.
190. Id.at 366, 758 P.2d at 316.
191. Id.
192. Id.at 367, 758 P.2d at 317.
193. 106 N.M. 732, 749 P.2d 1111 (1988).
194. Id. at 734, 749 P.2d at 1113. The statutory requirements for notice of sale are contained
in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-66(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1990), which provides that failure of the Property
Division to receive the return receipt shall invalidate the sale. A "red-tag" notice of delinquency
attached to the residence is the procedure called for in the administrative procedures of the Property
Tax Division. Klineline, 106 N.M. at 734, 749 P.2d at 1113.
195. Klineline, 106 N.M. at 734, 749 P.2d at 1113.
196. Id. at 735, 749 P.2d at 1114.
.197. Id.at 734, 749 P.2d at 1113.
198. Id.
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The supreme court held that the state had violated the notice statute,
which requires proof of actual delivery to the taxpayer or someone
authorized to accept delivery. 199 The receipt marked "unclaimed" did not
fulfill the requirements of the statute, and thus the tax sale was held
invalid.200
The third case involved a schoolteacher's right to an open public meeting
prior to her discharge from employment. In Kleinberg v. Board of
Education of Albuquerque Public Schools,20 ' the school board voted to

discharge the teacher and issued a written decision without first convening
an open public meeting. 202 The board held a public hearing and publicly

ratified its vote after the written decision had been submitted. 203 The
court of appeals held that any procedural error was cured by the hearing,
24
at which the teacher was afforded an opportunity to be heard. 0

2. Access to Information
The Inspection of Public Records Act 20 5 entitles New Mexico citizens
to inspect public records, subject to specific exceptions.2 0 6 More than a
decade ago, the supreme court created another exception exempting from
discovery information about which the public policy interest in confidentiality outweighs the policy favoring disclosure. 20 7 Two cases decided
during the survey period involved the right to inspect public records.
In State ex. rel Blanchard v. City Commissioners of Clovis,20 the city
sought to invoke the exception for confidential materials to protect
applications, resumes, and references submitted to the city for the position
of City Planner. 2 9 An editor of the Clovis New-Journal was seeking

199. Id. at 736, 749 P.2d at 1115. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-66(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1990) provides
that the sale should not be invalidated if the return receipt indicates that the taxpayer does not
reside at the address shown.
200. Klineline, 106 N.M. at 736, 749 P.2d at 1115.
201. 107 N.M. 38, 751 P.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1988).
202. Id. at 41, 751 P.2d at 725. The purpose of the New Mexico Open Meetings Act, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10-15-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1990), is "to open the conduct of the business of
government to the scrutiny of the public and to ban decision-making in secret." Gutierrez v. City
of Albuquerque, 96 N.M. 398, 400, 631 P.2d 304, 306 (1981).
•203. Kleinberg, 107 N.M. at 41-42, 751 P.2d at 725-26.
204. Id. at 44, 751 P.2d at 728. The court also held that the board's exclusion of evidence
concerning the teacher's collective bargaining agreement was harmless error. Id. at 46, 751 P.2d at
730.
205. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-1 to -3 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
206. The statute contains explicit exceptions. The statutory exceptions include:
A. records pertaining to physical or mental examinations and medical treatment of
persons confined to any institutions;
B. letters of reference concerning employment, licensing or permits;
C. letters or memorandums which are matters of opinion in personnel files or
students' cumulative files;
D. as provided by the Confidential Materials Act; and
E. as otherwise provided by law.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1988) (citation omitted).
207. State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 797, 568 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1977); see also
Kelly & Gilmore, supra note 1, at 594-95 nn.121-35 and accompanying text.
208. 106 N.M. 769, 750 P.2d 469 (Ct. App. 1988).
209. Id. at 772, 750 P.2d at 472.
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disclosure of the materials and brought a mandamus suit in district court
to compel disclosure. 210 The district court ordered disclosure and the city
the materials before disappealed, seeking an in camera inspection 2of
1
closure and raising other procedural issues. '
On appeal, the court held that the city had failed to disprove that the
materials were public records.21 2 Reviewing the evidence presented to the
trial court, the court of appeals determined that the city had failed to
present any evidence "that would show the records were not required
to be kept by law or as part of a duty to be discharged by any city
officer. '2 3 Further, the court held that the city had not shown that the
applicants for the job "either had or claimed any right of privacy and

confidentiality recognized at law. ''214

Finally, the court examined the requirements for in camera examination
and found that they had not been met by the city. 213 To gain a private
in camera inspection of the materials by the judge, the person seeking
review must: (1) be a citizen; (2) have a lawful purpose for seeking to
prevent disclosure; and (3) provide some justification why the court should
block disclosure. 21 6 The court concluded that the city failed to present
217
a convincing justification for shielding the materials from disclosure.
in camera inspection
The court affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow 2an
18
and affirmed the peremptory writ of mandamus.
Spadaro v. University of New Mexico Board of Regents 19 examines
the question of what documents are considered public records subject to
disclosure. In Spadaro, an Albuquerque resident posted a job listing
through the university's part-time student employment office to hire
domestic help. 220 Some of the students who interviewed for the job
allegedly filed complaints about the resident, and he petitioned in court
the custodian of records to obtain
for a writ of mandamus against
22
disclosure of the complaints. '
The supreme court held that the student complaints were not public
records and were therefore not subject to discovery under the inspection

210. Id. at 770, 750 P.2d at 470.
211. Id. at 772, 750 P.2d at 472. The city argued that the issue was moot because the city had
rejected all of the initial applicants, advertised the position a second time, and hired a new city
planner. Id. at 770, 750 P.2d at 470. The city also argued that joinder of the applicants as
indispensable parties was essential to protect their interests and provide for a just adjudication of
the mandamus petition. Id. at 770-71, 750 P.2d at 470-71. The court rejected both assertions,
finding that the original applicants' materials were a matter of public record and presumably that
the city had failed to show how the applicants' interests would be affected by the trial court
judgment. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 771, 750 P.2d at 471.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 772-73, 750 P.2d 472-73.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 773, 750 P.2d at 473.
219. 107 N.M. 402, 759 P.2d 189 (1988).
220. Id. at 403, 759 P.2d at 190.
221. Id.
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act. 222 In addition, the court declared that because the university was not

required by statute or policy to operate the employment office, and
a
neither the office nor its employees were identified, on the record, as
public office or public employees, the inspection act did not apply.223
3. Statement of Reasons
Requiring administrative agencies to publish findings following adjudicatory hearings facilitates review of their actions in the courts and helps
to ensure that the agencies had jurisdiction over the dispute and acted
with care.224 In Cibola Energy Corporation v. Roselli,225 the New Mexico
must "indicate [its] reasoning
Court of Appeals emphasized that an agency
'226
...and the basis on which it acted.
In Green v. New Mexico Human Services Department, Income Support
Division,227 a recipient of federal benefits under Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC") 28 appealed from an adjudicatory decision
of the Human Services Department ("HSD") regarding past eligibility
for the benefits. 229 According to the applicable statute, the HSD director
is required to notify the recipient "in writing of the director's decision
'230
[concerning the recipient's eligibility] and the reasons for the decision.

In this case, the written notice consisted of a signed form letter with a
in the box indicating that the final decision was in favor
check mark
231
of HSD.

The court held that the signature and check mark were insufficient
under the statute to inform the recipient of the reasons for the depart-

ment's decision. 232 The statement of reasons must "adequately reflect the
and the reasoning used in
basis for [the director's] . . . determination
' 233
arriving at such determination.

4. Timeliness of the Agency Hearing and Final Order
According to New Mexico law, agencies must render a decision on a
dispute within tfie statutorily prescribed time limit or risk losing juris222. Id. at 405, 759 P.2d at 192.
223. Id.
224. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.05, at 444-49 (1958); Kelly & Gilmore,

supra note 1, at 585 nn.248-55 and accompanying text.
225. 105 N.M. 774, 737 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1987).
226. Id. at 778, 737 P.2d at 559 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo County Valuation Protest
Bd., 90 N.M. 110, 115, 560 P.2d 174, 179 (Ct. App. 1977)).
227. 107 N.M. 628, 762 P.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1988).
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1968).
229. Green, 107 N.M. at 629, 762 P.2d at 916. HSD sought to impose a period of ineligibility
upon the recipient to make up for the time when she received benefits even though she was ineligible.
Id. The recipient argued that HSD was equitably estopped from imposing a new period of ineligibility
on her because she had relied on HSD's determination of her eligibility when she received the
benefits during that period. Id. The court remanded on the equitable estoppel issue, ordering the
hearing officer to make specific findings of fact concerning the elements of equitable estoppel and
whether it was applicable to this case. Id. at 631, 762 P.2d at 918.
230. ld. at 631, 762 P.2d at 918 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-3(D) (Supp. 1990)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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diction over the dispute to the courts.234 In Armijo v. Save 'N Gain,235
the court of appeals was faced with the question of whether its previous
holdings regarding time limits and jurisdiction applied to the Workers'
Compensation Division ("WCD"). The New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act requires that a claimant submit to an informal recommendation
process, from which a recommended solution must be issued within sixty
days.

236

The claimant in Armijo argued that the adverse decision issued 101
days after submission to informal proceedings was void for lack of
jurisdiction. 237 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that although the
legislative intent was to provide for expeditious resolution of claims, there
was "no legislative intent that the sixty-day time limit stated in Section
52-5-5-(C) preclude further administrative action. ' 238 The court reasoned
that previous cases resulted from a balancing of public and private rights,
while, by contrast, the statute in question was to provide expeditious
resolution of a claim on its merits. 23 9 The court gave no explanation of
how it reached this conclusion, but instead held that the failure of the
WCD to issue a recommendation within sixty days gave the claimant the
24
right to demand a formal hearing on the merits. 0
In Molina v. McQuinn,2 4' the appellee attempted to argue that the
statutory restrictions for disposition of a case applied equally to the
commencement of a case. 242 The supreme court rejected this notion,
holding that "[tihe scheme provided for the commencement of a case
is quite different than that provided for its disposition.

2

43

Although

agencies lose jurisdiction for failure to dispose of a case within the

234. See, e.g., Lopez v. Medical Examiners, 107 N.M. 145, 754 P.2d 522 (1988); Foster v. Board
of Dentistry, 103 N.M. 776, 714 P.2d 580 (1986); Varoz v. New Mexico Bd. of Podiatry, 104 N.M.
454, 722 P.2d 1176 (1986).
235. 108 N.M. 281, 771 P.2d 989 (Ct. App. 1989).
236. The applicable section of the statute requires that:
Upon receipt, every claim shall be evaluated by the director or his designee, who
shall then contact all parties and attempt to informally resolve the dispute. Within
sixty days after receipt of the claim, the director shall issue his recommendation
for resolution ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-5(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
237. Armijo, 108 N.M. at 282, 771 P.2d at 990.
238. Id. at 283, 771 P.2d at 991.
239. Id. The court also explained that previous cases all concerned professional licensing, a private
right which may be lost. Workers' compensation claims do not involve licensing; therefore, a
claimant's rights are not subject to being lost by the agency's failure to act. Id.
240. Id.
241. 107 N.M. 384, 758 P.2d 798 (1988).
242. Here, the New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry charged an optometrist with
prescribing a topical ocular agent without state certification to do so. The defendant argued that
the board failed to provide the defendant with discovery within 10 days of his request and failed
to provide him with a hearing within 60 days of service of notice, both of which are required by
statute. Id. at 385, 758 P.2d at 799.
Defendant also asserted that the board lacked the authority to suspend his optometry license for
two weeks as a penalty. Id. at 384-86, 758 P.2d at 798-800. The challenge to the board's authority
is discussed in Part I of this article. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
243. Id. at 385, 758 P.2d at 799.
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prescribed ninety-day period, agencies do not lose jurisdiction for failure
to commence an action within ninety days. 2"
III.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Duke City Lumber Co. v. New
Mexico Environmental Improvement Board,245 modified the standard of
review for administrative agencies from "substantial evidence" to "whole
246
record," but failed to articulate how the new standard was to operate.
The whole record standard of review 247 has been a fertile source of dispute
since that time, and cases decided during the survey year were no exception.
In National Council on Compensation Insurance v. State Corporation
Commission,24 an appeal from the Corporation Commission's denial of
workers' compensation rate increases, the supreme court repeated its
it
earlier holdings regarding whole record review. The court noted that' ' 249
"views the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency decision,
but the court may not do so "with total disregard to contravening
evidence. ' 250 At the same time, the court introduced a reasonableness
test for whole record review: "No part of the evidence may be exclusively

relied upon if it would be unreasonable to do

So. ''21'

But whether an

agency's consideration of evidence is reasonable implicitly requires reweighing evidence, something courts traditionally have been loathe to
do.252

In Tallman v. Arkansas Best Freight,253 the court of appeals initially
decided that the whole record standard of review applies to review of

244. Id. The rationale for this distinction, however, is not explained.
245. 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984).
246. The traditional substantial evidence standard has been applied by virtue of specific statutory
reference, see, e.g., Rinker v. State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973), and also
through general principles of common law, see, e.g., Toltec Int'l Inc. v. City of Ruidoso, 95 N.M.
82, 619 P.2d 186 (1980). This highly deferential substantial evidence standard of review has been
described as ."such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
See, e.g., Wickerstein v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 81 N.M. 188, 190, 646 P.2d 918, 920
(Ct. App. 1970). Under this standard, a reviewing court ignores evidence contrary to the agency's
decision and views all evidence in the light most favorable to the agency. See, e.g., Ricker v. State
Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973); United Veterans Orgs. v. New Mexico Property
Appraisal Dep't, 84 N.M. 114, 500 P.2d 199 (1973).
247. For an excellent discussion of the development of the whole record standard of review in
general and in New Mexico specifically, see generally Browde, supra note 10. The authors of this
survey are greatly indebted to Professor Browde for his scholarly work, which is the foundation
of this section of the Administrative Law Survey.
248. 107 N.M. 278, 756 P.2d 558 (1988).
249. Id. at 282, 756 P.2d at 562 (citing Wolfey v. Real Estate Comm'n, 100 N.M. 187, 668
P.2d 303 (1983)).
250. Id. (citing Human Servs. Dep't v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 176, 608 P.2d 151 (1980)).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Lujan v. Pendaries Properties, Inc., 96 N.M. 721, 635 P.2d 580 (1981); Worthey
v. Sedillo Title Guar., Inc., 85 N.M. 339, 512 P.2d 667 (1973).
253. 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).
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Workers' Compensation Division determinations.2 5 4 The Tallman court
described the substantial evidence standard as viewing all evidence in the
light most favorable to the agency and disregarding all evidence contrary
to the challenged decision. 255 The court described substantial evidence
review as "an examination of the evidence through a small aperture. ' 256
The court compared this to whole record review, stating that whole record
review does not involve the reweighing of evidence, 257 and had Duke City
intended such a departure from previous cases, it would have so stated.2 58
Although evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to an

agency,259 the reviewing court must nevertheless canvass all evidence "fa-

vorable and unfavorable, in order to determine if there is substantial
evidence to support the result." 2 6 After canvassing the evidence, the

court then determines if "there is evidence for a reasonable mind to

accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached." ' 26' Tallman provides
us with the theoretical process by which a court examines the whole
record without reweighing the evidence. 262
This tension was again displayed in Sanchez v. Wohl Shoe Company.263
In Sanchez, the claimant appealed the termination of workers' compensation benefits. A medical specialist recommended that the claimant could
return to work if she wore a special shoe, but her disability continued. 264
The hearing officer relied on the fact that the claimant could return to
work and terminated benefits; the claimant relied on her continuing
disability for the proposition that the benefits should continue. The court
noted that it "may not reweigh evidence or retry a disputed issue for
a different result where there is evidence to support the decision of the
265
fact finder."
254. Id. at 126, 767 P.2d at 365. Prior to 1985, compensation determinations were made by the
district court. In 1985, the legislature passed a new Workers' Compensation Act, which created an
administrative agency to make such determinations. Since the creation of the Workers' Compensation
Division, the court of appeals had only assumed, but never specifically decided, that the whole
record standard of review applies to appeals from the Division. Id.
255. Id. at 126-27, 767 P.2d at 365-66.
256. Id. at 127, 767 P.2d at 366.
257. Id. Whether evidence was to be reweighed was suggested in briefs submitted to the Tallman
court, as well as possibly implied in National Council on Compensation Ins. v. New Mexico State
Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278, 756 P.2d 558 (1988).
258. Tallman, 108 N.M. at 127, 767 P.2d at 366.
259. Id.at 129, 767 P.2d at 368 (citing Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 105 N.M. 467, 734
P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1987)).
260. Id. at 128, 767 P.2d at 367.
261. Id.
262. In two subsequent cases, the New Mexico Supreme Court, without specifically citing to
Tallman, implicitly affirmed that holding. In Rodman v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 107 N.M. 758,
759, 764 P.2d 1316, 1317 (1988), an unemployment compensation case, the court noted that "no
part of the evidence may be exclusively relied upon if it would be unreasonable to do so." When
evidence is amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court will not substitute its
reasonable interpretation for the agency's reasonable interpretation. In another unemployment compensation case, In re Apodaca, 108 N.M. 175, 769 P.2d 88 (1989), the supreme court agreed that
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the agency, and the court will not reweigh that
evidence.
263. 108 N.M. 276, 771 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1989).
264. Id. at 280, 771 P.2d at 988.
265. Id. (citing Sandoval v. Department of Employment Sec!, 96 N.M. 717, 634 P.2d 1269 (1981)).
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This observation is a retreat to the old substantial evidence test under
which the existence of any evidence would be sufficient to uphold an
agency determination regardless of the weight of contrary evidence. The
Sanchez court never attempted to articulate whether the hearing officer's
reliance on particular evidence was reasonable. Determining the reasonableness of the use of evidence inherently requires reweighing evidence,
something the courts have consistently said they will not do; yet failure
to do so emasculates the whole record standard of review, leaving extreme
deference to an agency and reviving of the substantial evidence test.
The whole record standard of review necessarily requires a complete
examination of the facts. Many cases, however, provide only a cursory
discussion of facts, therefore providing little, if any, insight into the
continuing development of what constitutes substantial evidence. In In
re Demand Metering by Otero County Electric Cooperative,266 an appeal
from the Corporation Commission's denial of demand metering practices,
the court simply reiterated its litany of whole record principles. Without
discussion, the court determined that "[tihe record reflects individual
customers of Otero testified to the disproportionate and harsh effects of
demand metering .... Since evidence existed upon which the Commission
could have found demand metering unjust and unreasonable, we must
affirm the Commission's decision.

' 267

Such conclusions, without any

analysis, do very little to elucidate the meaning of the whole record
standard of review.
Two cases in the survey period do, however, provide extensive insight
into the facts and their role under the whole record standard of review.
In Randolph v. New Mexico Employment Security Department,261 the
court provided a good example of the inner workings of whole record
review and substantial evidence. In that case, the appellant worked for
only four weeks. 269 During that time, four paychecks were received. Three
of the paychecks were issued late, and as to the fourth, she was told
not to cash the check until the following week. The supreme court held
that this was good cause for leaving employment. The court therefore
reversed the lower court's decision that appellant had generally been paid
in a timely manner based on lack of substantial evidence. Although
Randolph gives only rote discussion of the nature270of the whole record
standard of review, its application is illuminating.

266. 108 N.M. 462, 774 P.2d 1050 (1989).
267. Id. at 466, 774 P.2d at 1054.
268. 108 N.M. 441, 774 P.2d 435 (1989).
269. Id. at 442, 774 P.2d at 436. Appellant also worked briefly in 1981. Id. Appellant also
claimed that the religious influence in the work environment was religious harassment. The court
held that appellant's prior employment in 1981, with knowledge of the employer's religious predilections, amounted to acceptance of working conditions. Id. at 445, 774 P.2d at 439.
270. Although the fourth check was issued on time, Randolph was unable to cash it. Presumably,
the supreme court did not reweigh the evidence, but rather found that the Department's reliance
on one timely issued check provided no reasonable grounds for determining that Randolph had, in
general, been paid on time. Id. at 445, 774 P.2d at 439.
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In Molenda v. Tomsen, 271 the court affirmed a denial of unemployment
benefits. In that case, Molenda worked for an attorney for approximately
six weeks in 1987.272 During that period, the attorney, Thomsen, was
edgy, and Molenda confronted him concerning his behavior. Thomsen
apologized and said he would try to improve. One day, Molenda was
chatting with her boyfriend at the front desk. Thomsen yelled at her
and told her boyfriend to leave. Molenda responded with "[y]ou can't
yell at me or James in that tone. I love you dearly but I quit. '273
The supreme court noted that good cause for leaving employment
required circumstances "of such magnitude that there is no alternative
to leaving gainful employment." 274 The court held that Thomsen's previous
receptiveness to Molenda's complaints, and Molenda's failure to try to
resolve the incident before quitting, constituted substantial evidence to
uphold the denial of unemployment compensation. 27
In several other cases decided during the survey period, New Mexico
courts discussed under what circumstances the whole record standard of
review applies. In Tallman v. Arkansas Best Freight,276 the court of
appeals held that the whole record standard of review applies in appeals
277
from the Workers' Compensation Division.

In Tenneco Oil Company v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission,278 the court of appeals discussed the applicability of the whole
record standard of review in agency rulemaking proceedings .279 The Tenneco court held that the whole record standard of review from Duke
City also controls where an agency acts in its rulemaking capacity. 20 The
court reached this conclusion by finding similar statutory standards of
review in the statutes underlying Duke City and Tenneco. 28 Unresolved
is whether the holding in Tenneco applies only to the Water Quality
Control Commission, to all agencies for which appeal is based on "the
record made at the hearing," or to any agency acting in its rulemaking
capacity.
Several other cases decided during the survey period discuss additional
inner workings of the whole record standard of review. In both In re
271. 108 N.M. 380, 772 P.2d 1303 (1989).
272. Molenda previously worked with the attorney at the City Attorney's Office, and joined him
when he entered private practice. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 381, 772 P.2d 1304. Again, presumably the court found that the Department's reliance
on these factors was not reasonable.
276. 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).
277. Id.
278. 107 N.M. 469, 760 P.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 708, 749 P.2d 99
(1988).
279. All cases prior to Tenneco dealt with agency adjudications. Id.
280. Id. at 471, 760 P.2d at 163.
281. The court reasoned that:
Section 74-2-9 of the Air Quality Control Act is similar to Section 74-6-7 of the
Water Quality Act in providing that: 'appeals shall be upon the record made at
the hearing' and the court of appeals shall set aside the denial of a variance 'not
supported by substantial evidence.' (Emphasis in original.)
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Apodaca282 and Rodman v. New Mexico Employment Security Department, 283 the supreme court held that pursuant to court rules dealing with
unemployment compensation appeals, 28 4 the court may adopt new findings
amif the agency's findings were unsupported by substantial evidence,
25
biguous, or inadequate because of a misapplication of law.
These cases, at first glance, seem inconsistent with Green v. New Mexico
Human Services Department.8 6 In that case, which involved welfare
benefits, the court of appeals held that the failure to make specific
findings of fact should appropriately result in a remand. But the reason
for remand was the failure to make a factual finding regarding the
credibility of a witness, 287 not an ambiguous or unsubstantiated finding.
To this extent, Green can be reconciled with Apodaca and Rodman.
Traditional legal principles previously applied to the substantial evidence
standard of review need to be reinterpreted for application under the
whole record standard of review. Three cases during the survey period
addressed "legal residuum" and the review of agency actions. In Anaya
v. New Mexico State Personnel Board,2 the court confirmed that the
legal residuum rule equally applies under the whole record standard of
review. 289 The legal residuum rule does not require an agency to base its
decision entirely on admissible evidence. But, for the agency's decision
to be upheld, the "administrative action [must] be supported by some
291
evidence that would be admissible in a jury trial.' ' 290 In Tallman,' the
court stated that legal residuum applies in the "winnowing" process of
discarding irrelevant evidence. 292 And in Tenneco,'293 the court of appeals
refused to apply the legal residuum doctrine to its review of rulemaking
proceedings because rulemaking and adjudications lack sufficient similarity.294
Differing standards of review may apply depending on an agency's
enabling statute or constitutional provisions. In In re Burlington Northern
Railway,'295 the supreme court discussed the standard of review for the

282. 108 N.M. 175, 769 P.2d 88 (1988).
283. 107 N.M. 758, 764 P.2d 1316 (1988).
284. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-081(C)(4).

285. Apodaca, 108 N.M. at 177, 769 P.2d at 90; Rodman, 107 N.M. at 763, 764 P.2d at 1321.
286. 107 N.M. 628, 762 P.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1988).
287. Id.at 630-31, 762 P.2d at 917-18.
288. 107 N.M. 622, 762 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1988).

289. Id. at 626, 762 P.2d at 913. The court in Duke City also implicitly affirmed the continuing
applicability of the legal residuum rule: "[Tlhe substantial evidence rule and the whole record ...
reaffirm the rule that some competent evidence is required to support an action by an administrative
agency
290.
at 295,
291.

which affects a substantial right." Duke City, 101 N.M. at 295, 681 P.2d at 721.
Anaya, 107 N.M. at 626, 762 P.2d at 913 (emphasis omitted) (citing Duke City, 101 N.M.
681 P.2d at 721).
108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 781 P.2d 305 (1988).

292. Anaya, 107 N.M. at 624, 762 P.2d at 911.
293. 107 N.M. 469, 760 P.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1988).

294. Id. at 477, 760 P.2d at 169. Rulemaking inherently involves hearsay evidence gathered through
public comment. This lack of similarity implicitly invalidates the logic that similar statutory language

requires applying the whole record standard in rulemaking as well as in adjudications. Id.
295. 107 N.M. 582, 761 P.2d 855 (1988).
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State Corporation Commission's decision to deny a railroad's application
to close a station. The Corporation Commission's actions are controlled
by the New Mexico Constitution rather than by statute. 296 Because the
constitution requires a court to decide the case on its merits, 297 its review
"is more exacting than that normally accorded administration decisionmaking. ' 298 Although not a de novo review, 299 "the court makes an
independent determination that it is more likely than not that the Commission's order is just and reasonable, 3 °° rather than searching for substantial evidence based on the whole record." '0 1 Thus, the standard of
review for railroad applications is markedly different than that for most
administrative agencies.
It is apparent that the whole record standard of review is very much
factually driven, for it requires an examination of the entire factual
record. When the courts do examine and discuss all of the factual record,
we gain an insight into how this new test operates. When the courts fail
to do so, we are left with the unsettling feeling that the whole record
standard of review is little more than new clothing for the old substantial
evidence test.
BRENDAN MAHONEY
STEVEN E. SESSIONS

296. N.M. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
297. Cases may be removed from the Commission to the supreme court. Id. "[T]he said court
shall have the power and it shall be its duty to decide such cases on their merits." Id.
298. Burlington, 107 N.M. at 585, 761 P.2d at 858 (citation omitted).
299. Id. at 586, 761 P.2d at 859.
300. Id. (citation omitted).
301. Id.

